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Checks and Balances on the Fifth Branch of
Government: Colorado Environmental Coalition v.
Wenker and the Justiciability of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act
I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2001, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)
published a call for nominations to fill fourteen vacancies on
Resource Advisory Councils (“RACs”) in Colorado.1 The RACs are
made up of private citizens who help the BLM develop
environmental and public land use policies throughout the state.
Shortly after the announcement, the BLM received nearly fifty
applications for the positions, complete with the required letters of
reference from the applicants’ represented interests. Fifteen days
after the announced deadline for nominations, Colorado Governor
Bill Owens sent a letter to the Colorado Director of the BLM with a
list of thirteen names the Governor wished to nominate for the RAC
positions. However, the letter included no letters of reference or any
other documentation supporting the nominations. When the BLM
announced the appointments, all thirteen of Governor Owens’
nominees and only one of the other fifty nominees had been
selected.
Two of the rejected applicants and two environmental groups
challenged the BLM’s action in federal court for, among other
things, failing to ensure “that the advice and recommendations of
the advisory committee . . . not be inappropriately influenced . . . by
any special interest.”2 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that the issue was not subject to judicial review
because the decision of whom to appoint to the RACs was
“committed to agency discretion by law.”3 This Note argues that the
Tenth Circuit erred by disregarding Congress’s intent with respect to

1. See Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004).
2. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(3) (2000).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
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agency selections of advisory committee members and that such
agency decisions should be subject to judicial review.
These events and the court’s subsequent holding highlight one
of the primary concerns of administrative law in today’s regulatory
state—the danger of agency capture. According to some theories,
agency capture occurs when regulated industries come to dominate
the government entities charged with regulating them.4 Thus, much
of administrative law deals with the nature and scope of judicial
review of agency actions, providing a check on federal regulatory
agencies—the so-called “fourth branch” of government.5 However,
regulated industries may succeed in an alternative or “backdoor”
approach to agency capture through use of the numerous but
relatively unknown federal advisory committees, which some have
called the “fifth branch” of government.6 Advisory committees are
essentially private groups that perform research and make
recommendations to government agencies. Although these
committees can provide important expertise, their members
represent private interests and may offer biased opinions slanted in
favor of the interests they represent.
In 1972 Congress, concerned with the proliferation and
potential misuse of advisory committees, passed the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (“FACA”).7 Among FACA’s provisions, Congress
included two key requirements for creating advisory committees:
4. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050–52 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 DUKE L.J. 387.
6. See 117 CONG. REC. H2750 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1971) (statement of Rep.
Monagan), reprinted in FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT (PUBLIC LAW 92-463),
SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 259–60 (1978)
[hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]; Allan J. Stein, FOIA and FACA: Freedom of Information in the
‘Fifth Branch’?, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (1975).
To avoid confusion, it should be pointed out that the term “fifth branch of
government” has been applied to a variety of other public, quasi-governmental institutions.
See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their
Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1989) (applying the term to private
regulators such as the Better Business Bureau, the National Association of Security Dealers,
and the American Bar Association); William P. Fuller, Congressional Lobbying Disclosure Laws:
Much Needed Reforms on the Horizon, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 419, 420 (1993) (applying
the term to the lobbying industry).
7. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 2
(2000)).
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first, that “membership of the advisory committee . . . be fairly
balanced in terms of the points of view represented”8 and second,
that “the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee
. . . not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or
by any special interest.”9 In Colorado Environmental Coalition v.
Wenker,10 the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the BLM’s selection
of the Governor’s nominees as RAC members was subject to judicial
review under these two provisions or “committed to agency
discretion”11 and therefore not justiciable under the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Ultimately, the court
decided that while the “fair balance” provision of FACA was
justiciable, the “inappropriate influence” provision was not because
Congress had provided “no meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”12 However, a brief review
of FACA’s legislative history and related cases demonstrates that
Congress did provide such a standard and that the court diverged
from its own precedent by not looking to the legislative history for
that standard. In addition, the court may have missed an opportunity
in this case to clarify an important distinction between these two
FACA provisions, which would show why each provision should
independently present a justiciable issue.
This Note gives an overview of how the justiciability of agency
actions is treated in the APA and by the courts, a brief explanation of
FACA, and how the issue of justiciability has been addressed in other
FACA cases. Part III briefly reviews the facts and the court’s
reasoning in Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Wenker. Part IV
then analyzes the court’s conclusions and offers legal and policybased support as to why the Tenth Circuit should have considered
both of the relevant FACA provisions to be justiciable issues. Finally,
Part V concludes with a brief summary and outlook.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
(1985)).

5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2).
Id. § 5(b)(3).
353 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004).
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE APA AND FACA
While courts have generally acknowledged a strong presumption
in favor of judicial review of agency actions,13 Congress provided in
the APA for nonreviewability in certain narrow circumstances.14
Unfortunately, the APA does not make very clear when those
circumstances apply. The courts therefore have had to grapple with
the determination of when to apply the APA’s nonreviewability
provisions to challenges of agency actions. However, the courts have
not always come to clear consensus on when to grant judicial review
of agency decisions under the APA, particularly for claims of FACA
violations. For example, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued three separate opinions on the
justiciability of FACA provisions under the APA.15 This Part will
review the relevant provisions of the APA and FACA and outline
some of the various diverging judicial opinions that deal with these
provisions.
A. Justiciability of Agency Actions Under the APA
By the end of World War II, Congress saw that the vast array of
federal agencies it had created to regulate various industries needed
closer regulation itself. Therefore, in 1946 Congress passed the
Administrative Procedure Act to govern all federal agency
procedures, based partly on the notion that superb procedures would
lead to superior substantive results. Congress also hoped to make
agencies more accountable for the use of authority it had delegated
to them. In more recent decades, growing distrust of agency use (or
abuse) of that authority has led to calls for courts to apply stricter
scrutiny when reviewing agency actions.16 Since the APA governs

13. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (“[J]udicial review of
a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”).
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2).
15. See Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,
886 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
16. See, e.g., 5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & JOHN P. WILSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 28 (2d ed. 1984); CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO
GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988); SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79th
Cong., 1944–46 (1946); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65
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judicial review of agency decisions, most courts have interpreted the
APA to allow for broad judicial review. This Section reviews the APA
provisions that dictate when judicial review is not to be granted and
how courts have applied those provisions.
1. Foreclosure of judicial review in the APA
The APA sets out two circumstances under which a court may
not legally review an agency’s action. The first circumstance, defined
in section 701(a)(1) of the APA, occurs when congressional “statutes
preclude judicial review.”17 The second appears in section 701(a)(2)
and occurs when an “agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law.”18 Legal scholars have debated much over this
second provision for several reasons. First, it seems to create an
inherent inconsistency with section 706 of the APA, which requires
courts to “set aside agency action . . . found to be arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”19 The APA fails to explain how courts can review an agency
action for abuse of discretion in accordance with section 706 if the
agency’s decision is committed to agency discretion and therefore
non-reviewable under 701(a)(2).20 Second, the statutory language
itself is ambiguous. While the APA protects from review decisions
“committed to agency discretion by law,” it fails to define what “by
law” encompasses. Absent some explicit pronouncement from
Congress, courts must determine for themselves whether an agency’s
decision falls within the agency’s protected discretion “by law.”
These two apparent conflicts have led one commentator to suggest
that Congress passed section 701(a)(2) of the APA merely as a

COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE
L.J. 965, 966 n.9 (1969) (citing to eight previous works in an ongoing debate between
Professors Berger and Davis, discussing judicial review of agency actions); James V. DeLong,
New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399
(1986); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 469 (1986); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
18. Id. § 701(a)(2).
19. Id. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, supra note 16, at
60.
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political compromise21 and intended for it to have no force of law
other than what the courts are willing to give it.22
2. How the courts have approached non-reviewability under the APA
In accordance with the general policy favoring judicial review of
agency actions mentioned above, courts have construed the APA
provisions that bar review very narrowly. The United States Supreme
Court briefly addressed the ambiguities in these provisions in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.23 In that case, the
Secretary of Transportation was required by statute to consider
“feasible and prudent” alternative routes before building a highway
through a downtown public park.24 The Court rejected the notion
that the Secretary’s failure to do so constituted a decision
“committed to agency discretion” not reviewable under section
701(a)(2) of the APA.25 Instead, the Court called that provision “a
very narrow exception,” interpreting it to apply only “in those rare
instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply.’”26 Under this new standard, the
Court found that the statutory terms “feasible and prudent
alternative” supplied adequate “law to apply” and that the
Secretary’s decision was thus not “committed to agency discretion,”
but instead subject to review.27 This standard turns out to be narrow
indeed since agencies can generally act only when Congress delegates
power to them by statute,28 and courts can nearly always point to
such an enabling statute as “law to apply.”
The Court eased this narrow test somewhat in Heckler v.
Chaney.29 There, the Court declined to review the Food and Drug
Administration’s (“FDA”) refusal to grant a petition from prison
inmates to enforce standards for the drugs used in death penalty

21. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 689, 698 (1990).
22. Id. at 699.
23. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
24. Id. at 405 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (2000)).
25. Id. at 410.
26. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)).
27. Id. at 413.
28. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004).
29. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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lethal injections.30 Ultimately, the Court distinguished agency action
from inaction and concluded that since the FDA chose not to do
something, the presumption switched to no review—a presumption
that the inmates failed to overcome.31 In regards to the standard set
in Overton Park, the Court explained that section 701(a)(2) of the
APA cuts off review of a decision “committed to agency discretion”
when the relevant “statute is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of
discretion.”32 Thus, even if a statutory grant of authority to an
agency arguably provides “law to apply,” a court needs at least some
further guidance from Congress on how to proceed if the court is to
review an agency’s decision.
In Webster v. Doe,33 the Supreme Court further expanded this
test by looking beyond the plain statutory text for indications of
guidance from Congress. In Webster, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency had terminated a homosexual employee whom
he considered to be a security risk.34 The Court held that the
Director acted within his discretion under section 701(a)(2) of the
APA because the National Security Act allowed the Director to take
such actions whenever he “shall deem such termination necessary or
advisable.”35 The Court looked not only to the statutory language,
but also to the “overall structure” of the statute to conclude that the
statute “fairly exude[d] deference” to the Director, whose decision
was thus not subject to review.36
As it stands today, the Supreme Court’s section 701(a)(2)
jurisprudence interpreting when agency action is “committed to
agency discretion” requires a finding of nonjusticiability, not when
there is simply “no law to apply,” but when there is no judicially
meaningful standard by which to review the issue. While the
Supreme Court has considered statutory language and “overall
structure” in making this determination, the Tenth Circuit has gone

30. Id. at 823.
31. Id. at 831.
32. Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
33. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
34. Id. at 595.
35. Id. at 600 (quoting National Security Act § 102(c), 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (2000)).
36. Id.; see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (holding that Indian Health
Service’s decision to cancel a regional clinical services program in favor of a nation-wide
program was “committed to agency discretion by law” and thus not reviewable by the courts).
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even further and included consideration of “the structure of the
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature
of the administrative action involved.”37 Thus, at least in the Tenth
Circuit,38 courts may look much further than the simple text for
suggestions that Congress intended to leave the decision at issue up
to the agency’s discretion and consequently nonreviewable by a
court.
B. A Brief Overview of FACA
In 1972, Congress passed legislation39 aimed at reigning in what
it saw as a potentially dangerous expansion of government—advisory
committees.40 An advisory committee, as defined in FACA, is
essentially any private body created by a statute or by a government
actor that makes recommendations to a government decision maker,
especially federal agencies.41 Presumably, these private bodies are
composed of prominent figures in their respective fields who, will be
able to supply agencies with valuable research and expertise, allowing
the agency to make more informed decisions. However, Congress
had grown concerned with many aspects of advisory committees,
including their dramatic proliferation, lack of accountability, and
increasing drain on the federal budget.42
In particular, some members of Congress were worried that
advisory committees might serve as a device for surreptitious agency
capture. Special interests seeking to influence agency decision
making could “load” advisory committees with their own
representatives, who would make recommendations to promote their
37. Am. Bank v. Clarke, 933 F.2d 899, 902 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Block v. Cmty.
Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)).
38. The applicability of the Tenth Circuit’s expansion to courts in other circuits is in
question here because the court applied this test in a section 701(a)(2) case (“committed to
agency discretion”) even though the Supreme Court’s language it quoted comes from a case
dealing with section 701(a)(1) of the APA (preclusion of judicial review).
39. The Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 (2000)).
40. See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and
Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451 (1997); Richard O. Levine, The Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 225 (1973); Stein, supra note 6, at 34.
41. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3.
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017 (1972); S. REP. NO. 92-1098 (1972). Many of these
same concerns are ongoing. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEES: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE COULD HELP AGENCIES BETTER ENSURE
INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04328.pdf.
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agendas—agendas that may be contrary to the public interest.43 In
response to these concerns, FACA includes two key provisions: First,
under section 5(b)(2), any legislation or charter that establishes an
advisory committee must “require the membership of the advisory
committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented and the functions to be performed.”44 Second, under
section 5(b)(3), “appropriate provisions [must] assure that the advice
and recommendations to the advisory committee will not be
inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any
special interest.”45 These dual provisions constitute Congress’s
attempt to prevent advisory committees from becoming a “nesting
place”46 from which special interests could engage in “backdoor”
agency capture.
C. Justiciability of FACA Provisions under the APA
Predictably, courts have been asked to review agency actions
under FACA. As agencies have created advisory committees,
individuals and organizations have challenged the organization of
those committees under FACA’s section 5(b)(2) “fair balance”
provision and section 5(b)(3) “inappropriate influence” provision.
Courts have consequently had to decide whether to review the
agencies’ decisions or to decline to review them if “committed to
agency discretion” under the APA.47 The various diverging opinions
on this question have created something of a legal quandary,
including three separate opinions from a three-judge panel of the
D.C. Circuit48 and opposite conclusions by the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits.49
A panel of the D.C. Circuit engaged in a thorough discussion of
the justiciability under the APA of FACA’s “fair balance” and

43. See CONG. REC. S14, 644–55 (1972).
44. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2).
45. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(3). This Note refers to section 5(b)(2) as the “fair balance”
provision, and to section 5(b)(3) as the “inappropriate influence” provision.
46. CONG. REC. S14, 644–55 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at
205.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
48. See Public Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,
886 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
49. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing
Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 339 n.30 (5th Cir. 1999)).
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“inappropriate influence” provisions in Public Citizen v. National
Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods.50 In that
case, plaintiffs challenged the composition of a Department of
Agriculture advisory committee under sections 5(b)(2) and 5(b)(3)
of FACA; they claimed that all the committee members had strong
ties to the food industry and that none represented public health or
consumer interests.51 The district court dismissed the complaint,
holding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the advisory
committee was improperly balanced in terms of viewpoints or
inappropriately influenced by any special interest.52 The plaintiffs
then appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and in three separate opinions,
Judges Friedman, Silberman, and Edwards each took a different
approach as to both the justiciability of the claims and to the
outcome on the merits.53 A brief summary of their positions may
serve as a helpful guide: Judge Friedman implied justiciability and
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal on the merits.54 Judge Silberman
also affirmed the dismissal but argued that neither of the provisions
should be justiciable and never reached the merits.55 Finally, Judge
Edwards argued that the claims should be justiciable and the district
court’s dismissal reversed on the merits.56
Each of the D.C. Circuit Judges’ opinions in Microbiological
Criteria gives insight into how courts should approach whether to
review FACA challenges to advisory committees under the APA.
Although Judge Friedman did not directly address the issue of
justiciability, his analysis of the case under the “fair balance” and
“inappropriate influence” provisions provides an important
explanation of what each provision requires.57 Quoting from FACA’s
legislative history, Judge Freidman explained that to be “fairly
balanced” an advisory committee’s membership should be
“representative of those who have a direct interest” in the
committee’s work.58 He further explained that the “inappropriate

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

1056

886 F.2d 419.
Id. at 420–21.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 420–38.
Id. at 420–26 (Friedman, J., concurring).
Id. at 426–31 (Silberman, J., concurring).
Id. at 431–38 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 422–25 (Friedman, J., concurring).
Id. at 423 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 9 (1972)).
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influence” provision was “designed to protect against ‘the danger of
allowing special interest groups to exercise undue influence upon the
Government’” by dominating the membership of an advisory
committee59—essentially the agency capture theory. These
explanations help clarify what FACA provisions mean and why they
should be justiciable, as this Note discusses below in Part IV.
Judge Silberman’s opinion in Microbiological Criteria strongly
articulates the arguments against justiciability.60 Based on the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Heckler, Judge Silberman argued that
the relevant FACA provisions provide “no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion” and are
therefore not justiciable under the APA.61 He first addressed the “fair
balance” provision, pointing out that those terms are nowhere
defined in the statute and reasoning that courts cannot determine
whether undefined requirements have been met.62 He then turned to
the “inappropriate influence” provision, arguing that it was meant to
“prevent ‘inappropriate’ external influences on an already constituted
advisory committee” and that it “presupposes that an advisory
committee is already in existence and ‘fairly balanced’ in accordance
with section 5(b)(2).”63 Thus, according to Judge Silberman,
“inappropriate influence” is unrelated to committee membership,
which is only an issue in claims of “unfair balance.”64 He then argued
that even if “inappropriate influence” were related to membership,
the term “special interest” was too “value-laden [and] undefinable”
to provide a meaningful standard of review.65 These arguments were
echoed by the Tenth Circuit in this Note’s principal case and are
further discussed in Part IV below.
Finally, Judge Edwards in his partial dissent vigorously argued
that the “fair balance” claim presented a justiciable issue.66 He
contended that the strong presumption favoring judicial review is
not overcome just because “the ‘fairly balanced’ requirement falls
short of mathematical precision in application, or . . . may involve
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 425 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 6 (1972)).
Id. at 426–31 (Silberman, J., concurring).
Id. at 426 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
Id. at 426–30.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 432–34 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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some balancing of interests.”67 However, despite his enthusiastic
defense of section 5(b)(2)’s “fair balance” provision, Judge Edwards
inexplicably failed to address section 5(b)(3)’s “inappropriate
influence” provision. His silence may have implied an intention to
include 5(b)(3) when he found section 5 as a whole to be justiciable.
Judge Edwards did say that “the alleged violation of section 5”—
which he identified at the beginning of his opinion as section
5(b)(2),
(3)68—was
“also
judicially
cognizable.”69
This
characterization does not explain, however, why Judges Friedman
and Silberman both addressed each provision separately while Judge
Edwards did not. Alternatively, Judge Edwards may have agreed
with Judge Silberman’s view that 5(b)(3) deals only with external
influences on committee recommendations and is unrelated to
committee membership. Judge Edwards said that one of the
concerns Congress had when it enacted FACA was that
“governmental officials would be unduly influenced by industry
leaders” on committees, but that this concern “prompted Congress
to enact the ‘fairly balanced’ provision.”70 If this characterization of
Judge Edwards’s opinion is accurate, then he may have avoided
discussing 5(b)(3) because he viewed 5(b)(2) as both justiciable and
an independently sufficient basis for upholding the section 5 claims.
Whichever reading is correct, Judge Edwards did not discuss the
“inappropriate influence” provision, so his opinion is ultimately
inconclusive as to its justiciability.
Some of the confusion arising from the D.C. Circuit’s three-way
split in Microbiological Criteria has carried over into other circuit
court opinions. For example, the Fifth Circuit may have drawn
unwarranted conclusions from the D.C. Circuit’s divergent opinions
when it decided Cargill, Inc. v. United States.71 In Cargill, several
mine owners challenged a decision by the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) to entrust one of its
scientific advisory committees with peer reviewing a study on the
health effects of diesel exhaust on underground miners.72 The
plaintiffs alleged violations of FACA, including the “fair balance”
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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Id. at 432.
Id. at 437.
Id. (emphasis added).
173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 328.
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and “inappropriate influence” provisions.73 Holding in favor of
NIOSH on FACA claims, the Fifth Circuit relied on the opinions of
Judges Friedman and Edwards in Microbiological Criteria to find
both of these two provisions to be justiciable under the APA.74 With
respect to the “fair balance” provision, that reliance appears to be
justified. Judge Edwards strongly supported that view,75 and Judge
Friedman’s opinion was at least consistent with it.76 With respect to
5(b)(3)’s “inappropriate influence” provision, however, that reliance
appears to have been misplaced. The Fifth Circuit engaged in no
analysis of 5(b)(3)’s justiciability but purported in a footnote to
“follow the Microbiological Criteria majority,” citing to Judges
Friedman and Edwards’ opinions.77 As discussed above, Judge
Friedman implied but did not directly address the justiciability of
5(b)(3), and Judge Edwards failed to discuss it at all. While Justice
Edwards’s opinion may be read to imply justiciability of 5(b)(3) by
its discussion of 5(b)(2), it may also reasonably be read to deny it. In
either case, by relying on Microbiological Criteria, the Fifth Circuit
also likely imported the same uncertainty.
In sum, there appears to be no consensus in this fractured area of
law. Of the two circuit court opinions that have addressed whether
the “inappropriate influence” provision is justiciable, one has no
clear majority, and the other relies solely on the first. These cases are
important, however, because they provide a basis for analyzing the
issue in the principal case Colorado Environmental Coalition v.
Wenker.
A brief review of this background on the APA and FACA
provides the necessary context to a discussion of Wenker. First,
courts have generally acknowledged a strong presumption favoring
judicial review of government agency decisions. The APA mandates
no review, however, of decisions “committed to agency discretion by
law,”78 which the Supreme Court has interpreted to mean that there

73. Id. at 327, 337–38.
74. Id. at 335, 339.
75. Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 432–34 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 423–25 (Friedman, J., concurring).
77. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 339 n.30 (citing Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 425
(Friedman, J., concurring); id. at 432–34 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000).
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must be “no meaningful standards by which to judge the agency’s
exercise of discretion.”79 Some courts have dealt with whether this
applies to FACA, which governs federal advisory committees. Under
FACA, advisory committees must be “fairly balanced” in terms of
viewpoint and function and may not be “inappropriately influenced
. . . by any special interest.”80 Courts must therefore determine
whether these FACA provisions provide a meaningful standard for
courts to apply and are thus subject to judicial review under the
APA.
III. COLORADO ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION V. WENKER
A. The Facts
In March 2001, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM” or
“the agency”) published in the Federal Register a call for
nominations for private citizens to serve on Resource Advisory
Councils (“RACs”) in Colorado.81 RACs are designed to provide for
a balance of private interests to make land use policy
recommendations to the BLM.82 They are governed by the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), under which they must, among
other things, “be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented”83 and “not be inappropriately influenced by the
appointing authority or by any special interest.”84
The Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act85 (“FPLMA”) and BLM regulations,86
was to fill fourteen vacancies in the Colorado RACs.87 The BLM
received nearly fifty applications for the RAC positions by the

79. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
80. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2), (3).
81. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004); see 43 U.S.C.
§ 1739 (2000) (statutory provision directing the Secretary of the Interior to establish Resource
Advisory Committees).
82. See Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1224. For more information on the BLM’s Colorado
Resource Advisory Councils, see Bureau of Land Management, Resource Advisory Councils,
Colorado, http://www.blm.gov/rac/co/co_index.htm.
83. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2) (2000).
84. Id. § 5(b)(3).
85. 43 U.S.C. § 1739 (2000).
86. 43 C.F.R. § 1784 (2005).
87. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1226.
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announced deadline, complete with letters of reference from
represented interests, as required in the regulations.88 Fifteen days
after the deadline for receiving nominations, the Governor of
Colorado sent a letter to the BLM in which he recommended
thirteen individuals to serve on the RACs.89 However, the Governor
did not include letters of reference for any of his recommendations.90
Nevertheless, when the BLM announced the Secretary’s
appointments, all thirteen of the Governor’s recommendations and
only one of the prior applicants were selected to serve on the
RACs.91
B. The Procedural Setting
In response to the BLM’s apparent bias favoring the Governor’s
nominees, two rejected applicants and two environmental groups
brought an action in Federal District Court, challenging the
nominations and seeking to enjoin RAC meetings on three counts.92
First, they argued the nominations were improper because the
nominees lacked the requisite letters of reference from interest
groups.93 Second, they claimed that the Governor would have an
“inappropriate influence” over the RACs, in violation of section
5(b)(3) of FACA because he chose thirteen of the fourteen
appointees.94 Finally, they alleged that by appointing a
disproportionate number of the Governor’s nominees, the Secretary
had violated the requirement that the RACs “be fairly balanced in
terms of the points of view represented,” under section 5(b)(2).95
The district court dismissed the case on two grounds. It held first
that the plaintiffs lacked standing for failure to show injury-in-fact,
and second that the relevant provisions of FACA were not justiciable

88. Id.
89. Id. The regulations provide that the Secretary is to “consult” with the Governor on
appointments to the RACs. 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1(e) (2005).
90. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1226.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also Colorado Environmental Coalition et al., Briefing Packet on Unlawful
2001 Resource Advisory Council Process, at http://www.ourcolorado.org/alerts/
041802_racpacket.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2005) (setting out the plaintiffs’ principal
arguments for challenging the advisory committee appointments).
93. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1226.
94. Id.
95. Id.

1061

4ABBOTT.FIN

11/18/2005 1:10 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2005

for being “too vague to provide a meaningful standard of review”
under APA standards.96
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Holding
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case, holding that while the
two rejected applicants for RAC positions had standing, the
environmental groups did not.97 The court also held that the failure
of the agency’s regulations requiring letters of reference was
principally for the benefit of the agency and failure to enforce it did
not substantially harm the plaintiffs; thus, the requirement was not
judicially enforceable.98 Most importantly, the court held that while
the FACA provision that membership of advisory committees be
“fairly balanced” was justiciable, the provision that there be
“appropriate provisions to assure that the advice and
recommendations of the advisory committee . . . not be
inappropriately influenced . . . by any special interest” was not
justiciable because it was “committed to agency discretion by law”99
by virtue of lacking a “meaningful standard against which to judge
the agency’s exercise of discretion.”100 Specifically, the court
reasoned that the plaintiffs were really alleging that because the
Governor had nominated so many of the RAC members, he would
have undue influence over the decisions and recommendations of the
RAC.101 The court then determined that Congress had provided no
guidance for determining whether such “hypothetical future
influence” would be inappropriate, and that the issue was therefore
nonjusticiable.102
IV. ANALYSIS
This opinion by the Tenth Circuit represents the latest federal
circuit court analysis on the issue of reviewability of agency actions
under FACA. Unfortunately, by holding that the “inappropriate
influence” claim was not justiciable, the court likely missed an
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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Id.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1229–30.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000).
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1231.
Id. at 1231–32.
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opportunity to set a compelling precedent that would ensure the
independence of advisory committees and protect them from agency
capture. This Part explains how the court came to its conclusion by
failing to consider FACA’s legislative history and by
mischaracterizing the plaintiffs’ “inappropriate influence” claim as an
“unfair balance claim.” In addition, this Part discusses why the
singular circumstances of this case, in which the plaintiffs impute the
role of “special interest” to the Governor, should not affect the
analysis. Finally, this Part conjectures that future courts will not likely
uphold similar claims of FACA violations, even if they find them
justiciable.
A. Why Judicial Review Best Effectuates Congressional Intent
The Tenth Circuit in Wenker held that the “inappropriate
influence” provision of FACA was not justiciable because there was
no guidance from Congress on what the provision meant.103 In other
words, the court claimed to have no way of knowing whether
upholding the plaintiffs’ “inappropriate influence” claim was the type
of grievance Congress sought to redress by enacting that provision.
Instead the court held that the claim would best be addressed under
the “fair balance” provision. A review of the legislative history of
FACA demonstrates that Congress intended the “inappropriate
influence” provision to address the plaintiffs’ particular type of claim.
In addition, the facts in Wenker illustrate why the plaintiffs’ claim
could properly be addressed only by that provision. This Section
explains how both of these aspects weigh in favor of justiciability.
1. The legislative history of the “inappropriate influence” provision
By holding the “inappropriate influence” provision in section
5(b)(3) of FACA to be nonjusticiable, the Tenth Circuit departed
from its own precedent by disregarding the legislative history of the
Act. Specifically, the court held that the agency’s decision was
“committed to agency discretion”—and thus not justiciable under
the APA104—based on the court’s finding that Congress provided
“no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s

103. Id.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000).
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exercise of discretion.”105 While the text of the statute itself may not
reveal the “meaningful standard” the court sought, an earlier Tenth
Circuit case identified legislative history as a viable source for such
congressional guidance.106 FACA’s legislative history indicates that
Congress intended the Act to prevent the precise type of violation
alleged. Nevertheless, the court omitted references to both its earlier
case and the legislative history from its “inappropriate influence”
discussion.
The Tenth Circuit’s approach to interpreting section 5(b)(3) of
FACA demonstrates why the court found no “meaningful standard.”
The plaintiffs in Wenker argued that the BLM had violated the
“inappropriate influence” provision by selecting a disproportionate
number of the Governor’s nominees to serve on the RACs.107 The
Governor, the plaintiffs claimed, was a special interest who would be
able to exert an inappropriately large amount of influence over the
RACs “by virtue of having nominated or endorsed such a large
percentage of the membership.”108 The court, however, did not view
section 5(b)(3) to be related to selection of membership. Instead,
the court read the provision to deal with direct attempts to control
committee work from outside the committee’s membership. An
example of this would be “bribes or threats from a recommending
interest group to its nominee,” which, of course, was never
alleged.109 The court concluded that whether the “kind of
hypothetical future influence” that was alleged should be considered
“inappropriate” within the meaning of the statute was an issue on
which the court had “absolutely no guidance, guidelines, or
standards from Congress.”110 Had the court looked beyond the
simple text of the statute and considered the legislative history,
however, it likely would have found that guidance.
The Tenth Circuit earlier found it appropriate to search
legislative history for the “meaningful standards” from Congress that
are necessary for finding a challenge to an agency decision

105. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830).
106. See Am. Bank v. Clarke, 933 F.2d 899, 902 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Block v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)).
107. Wenker, 353 F.2d at 1230.
108. Id. at 1231.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1232.
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justiciable.111 In American Bank v. Clark, the Tenth Circuit held that
a decision by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency to enter a
closure order was “committed to agency discretion” and not
justiciable under section 701(a)(2) of the APA.112 The court quoted
a Supreme Court case stating that “[w]hether and to what extent a
particular statute precludes review is determined not only from its
express language, but also from . . . its legislative history.”113 The
court then applied this approach by examining the “language of the
statute,” the “structure of the Act,” and the “goals” that “Congress
sought to achieve” by passing the statute.114 Despite this illustrative
precedent, the Tenth Circuit failed to examine the legislative history
of FACA in Wenker.
The Tenth Circuit claimed in Wenker that Congress provided
“absolutely no guidance” as to what kind of influence should be
considered “inappropriate” under section 5(b)(3) of FACA.115
However, the legislative history of FACA indicates that the influence
an entity might wield by having nominated a disproportionate
number of committee members—essentially the allegation in
Wenker—is exactly the type of influence Congress aimed to prevent.
In a report to the House of Representatives on FACA, the House
Committee on Government Operations stated that “[p]articularly
important among the guidelines are the requirement contained in §
[5](b)(2) . . . and the requirement contained in § [5](b)(3) . . . .”116
The report explained their importance by warning that “[o]ne of the
great dangers in the unregulated use of advisory committees is that
special interest groups may use their membership on such bodies . . .
to exercise undue influence upon the Government through the
dominance of advisory committees.”117 The report illustrated this
danger by citing a case in which a particular advisory committee
included members from only one industry; the report assured
Congress that FACA would prohibit “the heavy representation of

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

American Bank, 933 F.2d at 902.
Id. at 900–02.
Id. at 902 (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)).
Id. at 903.
Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1232.
H. R. REP. NO. 92-1017 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at 276.
Id. (emphasis added).
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parties
whose
private
interests
could
influence
their
recommendations.”118
This concern over disproportionate representation also appeared
in the Senate’s discussion. A study submitted to the congressional
record warned that advisory committees “can be a convenient
nesting place for special interests seeking to change and preserve a
federal policy for their own ends” and that “[s]uch committees
stacked with giants in their respective fields can overwhelm federal
decision makers.”119 Thus, members of both the House and Senate
expressed apprehension that interest groups could manipulate public
policy by installing a disproportionate number of their own
representatives on advisory committees. In spite of this record, the
Wenker court did not mention the legislative history and maintained
that Congress had provided no guidance.120
Just because the court did not address the legislative history in its
opinion, however, does not necessarily mean the court ignored it
completely. The court may not have referred to the legislative history
if it believed the above quoted passages did not apply to 5(b)(3)’s
“inappropriate influence” provision but only to 5(b)(2)’s “unfair
balance” provision. The court did suggest that the plaintiff’s 5(b)(3)
claims should have been addressed under “unfair balance,”121 and
this view would be consistent with the opinions of Judges Silberman
and Edwards in Microbiological Criteria.122 Other factors, of course,
weigh against taking such an approach. The legislative history itself
never separates the two provisions in this manner, and Judge
Friedman applied language from the legislative history specifically to
section 5(b)(3).123 If, as the court suggested, section 5(b)(2)
adequately satisfies both Congress’s and the plaintiffs’ concerns, and
the legislative history does not apply to 5(b)(3), that would leave
5(b)(3) without any “judicially meaningful standards” and hence
unjusticiable. The next Section explains why some of Congress’s
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. CONG. REC. S14, 644–55 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at 205
(emphasis added).
120. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1232.
121. Id.
122. See Public Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,
886 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring); id. at 432–34 (Edwards, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); supra text accompanying note 70.
123. See Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 425 (Friedman, J., concurring) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 6; 118 CONG. REC. 30,276 (1972)).
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concerns over disproportionate representation can adequately be
addressed only by giving independent significance to the
“inappropriate influence” provision in cases such as Wenker.
2. Properly distinguishing the “fair balance” provision
The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ “inappropriate influence”
claim because, in the court’s view, it was not justiciable and was
really a claim of “unfair balance.”124 However, the particular facts in
Wenker reveal a critical distinction between the claimed violation and
what the “unfair balance” provision addresses. This Section explains
the court’s conception of the statute, the nature of the claim, and
why the claim would properly be addressed under the “inappropriate
influence” provision.
According to the court, FACA’s “inappropriate influence”
provision protects advisory committees from active, external
influences and is unrelated to committee membership.125 Under this
conception, the provision may prevent special interests from
pressuring committee members to vote in a particular way on
pending issues, but it would have nothing to do with membership
selection. As Judge Silberman stated, “[T]he provision presupposes
that an advisory committee is already in existence and ‘fairly
balanced’ in accordance with section 5(b)(2).”126 According to the
claim, on the other hand, the provision should also protect against
indirect, structural influences.127 Under this alternative conception,
even if the Governor never directly involved himself with the
committees again, he nevertheless already would have left an
indelible mark on the RACs by having installed a disproportionate
number of members—all of whom presumably share many of the
Governor’s views on land use and environmental issues.
The court stated that this second type of grievance should be
addressed under section 5(b)(2), which requires a fair balance “in
terms of the points of view represented.”128 The text of 5(b)(2)
facially supports the court’s conclusion; if all the nominees share the
Governor’s views, that would result in an imbalance of viewpoints.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1232.
See id. at 1231.
Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 430 (Silberman, J., concurring).
See Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1231.
Id. at 1232.
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However, because of the difficulty in discerning a “virtually
infinite”129 array of “points of view,” courts have interpreted the
provision to require instead a balance of represented interests as
proxy.130 Under this interpretation, even if the majority of committee
members shared similar personal views, the committee would still
comply with the “fair balance” provision as long as they represented
a balanced variety of interest groups.
In most cases, where the nominating entity is the same as the
represented interest, the “fair balance” provision as interpreted
would prevent a single entity from selecting a disproportionate
number of committee members. If, however, the chosen members
represent interests different from the entity that nominated them,
the “fair balance” provision may be inadequate. In Wenker, the court
never suggested that nominees represented the Governor; they
represented their respective employers and affiliated organizations.131
Assuming that the Governor chose individuals from a variety of
organizations, the RACs would satisfy section 5(b)(2) for being
“fairly balanced” in terms of the interests represented. The problem
would remain, however, that the Governor hand picked a
disproportionate number of RAC members—members who are likely
to share his own views on land management and environmental
issues. While the committees would be “fairly balanced” in terms of
represented interests, the Governor would have had an enormous
impact on their work by selecting so many of their members. Thus,
neither the plaintiffs’ claims in Wenker nor Congress’s concerns in
the legislative history were adequately addressed by the “fair
balance” provision. To remedy this problem, the “inappropriate
influence” provision should be given independent significance with
respect to selecting committee members.
B. Government Entities as Special Interests
When the plaintiffs in Wenker charged the BLM with allowing a
“special interest” to influence the selection of RAC members, they

129. Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 426 (Silberman, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 423 (Friedman, J., concurring) (citing Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Executive
Comm., 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
131. See Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1225–26 (describing the three groups of interests RAC
members were to represent, including industry, environmental protection, and the general
public).
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did not point to a large corporation or private industry as the
culprit—entities usually associated with the term “special interest”—
but to the Governor of Colorado. Section 5(b)(3) of FACA requires
“that the advice and recommendations to the advisory committee
. . . not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or
by any special interest.” The plaintiffs’ claim raises the question of
whether a government actor should be considered a “special
interest” under FACA or in general. The court in Wenker did not
address this issue likely because it did not find the claim to be
justiciable; but if the claim is justiciable, the question becomes
critical. If Congress had intended for the “inappropriate influence”
provision to apply only to “private” entities, then the Governor’s
actions would be no violation because he would not be considered a
“special interest.” While members of Congress may not have had
state Governors in mind when they enacted FACA, no meaningful
distinction likely exists, and the provision against “special interests”
should apply equally to “public” and “private” entities.
As a practical matter, public officials should not be presumed
always to be acting in the best interests of the public. According to
one of the central tenets of public choice theory, a branch of
economics and political science, government officials operate as
rational, self-interested economic actors just as private entities do.132
Under this theory, both are presumed to make rational, economic
decisions to promote their respective interests. Just as private
business owners seek to maximize profits, government agencies seek
to maximize their regulatory authority or their budget.133 Politicians
132. For a general discussion of public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 284 (1992) (recognizing both the potential and limits to understanding
both law and law making through public choice theory); Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of
Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994). For
a more in depth discussion, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Univ. of Mich.
Press
1965)
(1962),
available
at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/
buchCv3Contents.html.
133. For application of public choice theory to administrative law in particular, see THE
BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (André Blais & Stéphane
Dion eds., 1991); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 23-25 (1997); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 640–41 (6th ed., 2003) (1973); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating
the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R.
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seek to please their constituencies and to be reelected. Public choice
theory holds that while altruistic efforts to serve the “public good”
may occur, the driving motivation of public entities comes from
these more practical concerns. Therefore, under this theory, the
Governor would be most likely to nominate to the RACs individuals
whom he believes will best serve his political interests.
If, as public choice theory suggests, the Governor primarily seeks
the interests of his constituents, he may qualify as a “special interest”
to the extent that those interests are not universal. The Governor’s
constituency may have different values and priorities than the general
public; he may promote the interests of his political base over those
of the state in general or those of the state over those affected in
other states. For example, if a Governor owes her successful election
to people who favor promoting local industries over environmental
protection, her RAC nominees may reflect that view to the detriment
of environmental resources and those who rely on them.134 As Judge
Silberman noted in Microbiological Criteria, the term “special
interest” serves primarily “as a political pejorative (typically referring
to an interest of which the speaker disapproves).”135 Thus, the
Governor’s interests are just as likely as a private entity’s to be
“special” and fall within the scope of the “inappropriate influence”
provision.
The Fifth Circuit has also expressed the view that government
entities should be considered “special interests” for purposes of
preventing “inappropriate influences.”136 In Cargill, the Fifth Circuit
was “troubled” that two members of an advisory committee were
allowed to participate in a study on diesel exhaust while interviewing
for jobs with government agencies “whose regulatory authority
Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA.
L. REV. 271 (1986).
134. Several commentators have noted with particular apprehension the implications of
public choice principles applied to environmental and land use policy. See Michael C. Blumm,
Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 405 (1994); Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998); Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox:
Political Prestidigitation and an Enduring Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2004)
Sheila Lynch, Note and Comment, The Federal Advisory Committee Act: An Obstacle to
Ecosystem Management by Federal Agencies?, 71 WASH. L. REV. 431 (1996) (arguing for more
restrictive application of FACA to groups that advise on land policy issues).
135. Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 430 (Silberman, J., concurring).
136. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 339 (5th Cir. 1999).
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[would] be directly affected by the results of the diesel study.”137
While the court did not view only two of the fifteen members as
rising to the level of “inappropriate influence,” it nevertheless
recognized the danger of allowing public entities with a stake in
advisory committee work to have an influence.138 Therefore, both
political theory and the reasoning of this Fifth Circuit case indicate
that a government actor such as the Governor should be considered
just as much a “special interest” as any private entity.
C. Prognosis for Future Cases
The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Wenker suggests that courts in
future FACA cases are actually likely to review but rarely uphold
“inappropriate influence” claims whether or not they find such
claims to be justiciable. The court’s approach in Wenker illustrates
how concluding that an agency’s action is not reviewable often
requires an analysis as detailed as, and often indistinguishable from,
an actual review of the agency’s action. Even if a court does find a
claim to be reviewable, however, it is unlikely to overturn the
agency’s decision because of the relatively high standard of review.
Even on a cursory reading, the court in Wenker appeared to be
reviewing the “inappropriate influence” claim even though it
ultimately concluded that claims under that provision are not
reviewable.139 The court went into a detailed analysis of the facts,
considered possible interpretations of the statute, and hypothesized
as to what types of actions would violate the provision140—all
components of a full-fledged judicial review. At least one
commentator has observed this phenomenon in cases where courts
have held that an agency “action is unreviewable if and only if
judicial review of the decision would be infeasible.”141 Such cases
include Overton Park and Heckler, where the Supreme Court held
that there must be “no law to apply”142 or “no meaningful standards
from Congress.”143 In such cases, “a court cannot find an agency

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
See Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Levin, supra note 21, at 734.
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
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action unreviewable without thinking about the substance of the
challenger’s contentions—that is, reviewing the action.”144 Thus, as a
practical matter, courts that find “inappropriate influence” claims to
be nonjusticiable will still have to actually review the claims.
Even if future courts disagree with Wenker and find the
“inappropriate influence” provision to be justiciable, they are
unlikely often to uphold a claim on the merits due to deference for
agency decisions. For a court to overturn an agency’s decision, the
APA requires a finding that the agency’s action is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.”145 While a court may still find that an agency has abused
its discretion under FACA by creating patently unbalanced advisory
committees or by allowing a single interest to endorse a
disproportionate number of committee members, such cases will
likely be rare. The court in Wenker ultimately remanded the case to
determine whether the nomination by the Governor of thirteen of
the fourteen appointees violated the “fair balance” provision,146 but
courts in less extreme cases likely will defer to agency selections
under the APA’s standard.
V. CONCLUSION
When Congress passed FACA, one of its clear intentions was to
protect advisory committees from becoming a tool of agency
capture. Congress recognized at the time that “an invitation to
advise can by subtle steps confer the power to regulate and
legislate.”147 Therefore, Congress incorporated provisions into FACA
that it hoped would assure fairly balanced advisory committees that
would be immune from inappropriate influences by special interests.
For an ally in the struggle against agency capture and as an enforcer
of these provisions, Congress has had to rely on the courts. And the
courts’ primary weapon in the arsenal against agency capture has
long been a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency
actions.

144. Levin, supra note 21, at 735.
145. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
146. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004).
147. 92 CONG. REC. S14644-55 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at
205 (quoting Congressman Monagan).
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By finding a claim based on section 5(b)(3) of FACA to be
unjusticiable, the Tenth Circuit took a step toward undermining this
presumption. The court based this step on the APA provision
prohibiting judicial review on issues that are committed to agency
discretion, even though that provision is poorly elucidated in both
the legislative history and prior court decisions. In addition, the
court’s decision disregarded Congress’s clear intent to make an
inappropriate-influence violation out of an agency action that allows
a single interest to select a disproportionate number of advisory
committee members. Finally, the court appeared to say one thing
and do the opposite when it engaged in a review of the issue to
determine that the issue was unreviewable. While a future court may
find the Tenth Circuit’s precedent persuasive when faced with the
difficult decision of whether to grant judicial review of an agency
action under section 5(b)(3) of FACA, hopefully it will consider how
its decision will further or detract from Congress’s struggle against
the dangers of agency capture.
Joshua W. Abbott ∗
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